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Smith: Specific
of Inchoate Dower Under Sta
QUARTERLY
VIRGINIA LAW Release
WESTPerformance--Forcing
whether "public policy" demands that the courts give such zealous regard to enforcing these contracts, even to the extent of overstepping the crystallized rules of contract law in order to reach
the desired result."
-FREDERICK

H.

BARNETT.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - FORCING RELEASE OF
INCHOATE DOWER UNDER STATUTORY SCHEME
A husband desiring to sell property sought to avail himself
of a statute providing for the compulsory release of inchoate
dower.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted
the relief sought, holding the statute in question not unconstitutional as impairing existing dower rights. Inchoate dower, being
only a possibility of an estate, is subject to the control of the
legislature (by dictum) even to the extent of destroying it. The
statute, being a proper exercise of this legislative power, is not
unconstitutional. Ruby v. Ruby.' These principles are supported
by the great weight of authority and require no further consideration here.
24

Note (1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 270.

'W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 43, art. 1, § 6. See text above n. 27, inf'a.
2
Ruby v. Ruby, 163 S. E. 717 (W. Va. 1932).
"That a wife's dower is inchoate until the husband dies: McNeer v.
McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681 (1892) (overruling earlier Illinois decisions to the contrary); Pritchard v. Savannah St. & RR. Co., 87 Ga. 294,
13 S. E. 493 (1891); State v. Probate Ct., 137 Minn. 238, 163 N. W. 285,
L. R. A. 1917F, 436 (1917); Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W.
257 (1911); Thornburg v. Thornburg, 18 W. Va. 522 (1881).
That inchoate dower interests are completely subject to legislative control;
Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 23 L. ed. 124 (1875); Thornburn v.
Doscher, 32 Fed. 810 (D. Ore. 1887); Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land
Co., 54 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1893); Ferry v. Ry. Co., 258 U. S. 314, 42
S. Ct. 358, 20 A. L. R. 1326 and note (1922); Billings v. People, 189 Ill.
472, 59 N. E. 798 (1901); McNeer v. McNeer, supra; Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 137 (1891); Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan.
508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918); McAllister v. Dexter & P. R. Co., 106 Me. 371,
76 Atl. 891 (1910); Griswold v. McGee, 102 Minn. 114, 112 N. W. 1020,
113 N. W. 382 (1907); Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322
(1866); Chouteau v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 458, 30
S. W. 299 (1894); Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 119 N. W. 781 (1909);
Moore v. New York, 4 Sandf. 456 (1851) ; aff'd, 8 N. Y. 110, 59 Am. Dec. (1853) ; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547, 67 Am. Dec. 355. and note (1856) ;
Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161, 5 A. L. R. 1343 and note
(1919); Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. 449, 55 Am. Dec. 573 (1851); Shell v.
Duncan, 31 S. C. 547, 10 S. E. 330 (1889); Hamilton v. Hirsch, 2 Wash.
223, 5 Pac. 215 (1885); Thornburg v. Thornburg, supra; Bennett v. Harsm,
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Three main types of relief have been formulated by the
courts for the situation in which a vendee asks for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land in which the wife of
the vendor has refused to join.' But the cases, in the words of a
Missouri court,' are in "much confusion and irreconcilable contrariety".
The first allows specific performance only if the buyer is
willing to pay the full purchase price with no compensation made
The reason given for
for the unconveyed interest of the wife.
this rule is that it prevents any possibility of a husband coercing
his wife to release her dower. It is equally true, however, that
the rule neglects the rights of the purchaser and leaves him without adequate redress. Furthermore, since the amount of damages
a husband would have to pay when sued at law under this rule is
the difference between the contract price and the actual value
of the land sold,' this rule may furnish an ill-disposed wife with
an opportunity of subjecting her husband to damages at will. The
desirability of a rule so capable of working an unfair result is
seriously open to question.
The second allows specific performance with a deduction from
the purchase price of the estimated value of the wife's interest.'
51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222 (1881). But after the death of either spouse the
interest of the other becomes vested and not subject to legislative control,
since statutes divesting previously vested rights are not upheld. McAllister
v. Dexter & P. R. Co., supra; Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37, 74 Am. Dec. 200
(1859); Moore v. Kent, 37 Iowa 20, 18 Am. Rep. 1 (1873); Bottorft v.
Lewis, 121 Iowa 37, 95 N. W. 262 (1903) (dower of widow having vested
on death of husband held incapable of being increased by subsequent legislation to the prejudice of heirs).
'Hazelrig v. Hutson, 18 Ind. 481 (1862); Zebley v. Sears, 38 Ia. 507
(1874); Hession v. Linastruth, 36 Ia. 483, 65 N. W. 399 (1895); Noecker
v. Wallingford, 133 Ia. 605, 111 N. W. 37 (1907); Stein v. Francis, 91 N.
X. Eq. 205, 109 Atl. 737 (1919); Schefrin v. Wilensky, 92 N. J. Eq. 109,
111 Atl. 660 (1920); aff'd, 92 N. X. Eq. 705, 114 Atl. 927 (1921) (realty
dealers refused to perform contract to sell, the price having meanwhile risen,
giving as reason that wife of one refused to release dower. Collusion with
the wife appearing, plaintiff was given a decree for specific performance
with indemnity for dower); Wright v. Young, 6 Wis. 127, 70 Am. Dec. 453
(1857); Conrad v. Schwamb, 53 Wis. 372, 10 N. W. 395 (1881); O'Malley
v. Miller, 148 Wis. 393, 134 N. W. 840 (1912) and cases cited in Notes
(1924) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 470 and (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 523.
56 Tebeau v. Ridge, 261 Mo. 547, 568, 170 S. W. 871 (1914).
Plum v. Mitchell, 26 S. W. 391, 392 (Ky. 1894).
7It is a general rule that where a vendor has contracted to convey a
larger estate than he has, the vendee is entitled to specific performance of
the contract with an abatement in the purchase price for that part of the
interest which the vendor is unable to convey. Several courts hold dower
an exception to this rule on the ground of likelihood of coercion of the wife
and difficulty of computing the value of inchoate dower, but others hold
Notes
neither reason is sufficient to take a case out of the general rule.
(1921) 30 YA.E L. X. 523; (1921) 25 HAav. L. REV. 731.
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Much can be said both for and against this rule. On the one side
it indirectly coerces the wife and substitutes the terms of the
court for the contract made by the parties, virtually enforcing an
agreement which was never made.8 Coercion usually results
where an abatement is allowed, because the husband quite naturally brings pressure to bear on his wife to compel her to join in the
conveyance. Furthermore, while an abatement based on mortality
tables is approximately correct, it may work extreme injustice in
an individual case since the dower may never vest. On the other
side, the value of this right so calculated is in most cases fair and
to refuse specific performance with this abatement against a
vendor who has pretended he was able to convey the fee is to let
him profit by his own misconduct. It has been given as an explanation of this rule that the vendor, having asserted title to
all the land, is estopped to deny it later.' Apparently, however,
the real justification is the great hardship resulting when the
purchaser is left to his remedy at law and the comparatively
slight hardship to the vendor in making him convey part of what
he contracted to convey for a compensation on approximately the
basis contracted for by the parties.
This rationalization is especially applicable in those jurisdictions in which the vendee of
land is not allowed damages for the loss of his bargain.'
Where the vendee is aware of the defective title, this rule has
been held not to apply, not because such knowledge defeats the
estoppel but because there is less hardship in denying relief to a
purchaser with notice of the outstanding dower than to a purchaser without such knowledge.' And if the defect is known but
the vendor assures the buyer of his ability to remove that defect,
the purchaser is usually allowed this type of relief.' Some courts,
however, refuse ever to allow specific performance with abatement unless the wife's refusal was procured by the husband or
unless misrepresentation by the wife existed (she then not being
an innocent party),' on the ground that the value of an inchoate
dower is purely conjectural and not capable of ascertainment and
8 The Scotch law refuses thus to remake the contract. Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 App. Cas. 75, 102 (1890).
0Rudd v. Lascelles, (1900) 1 Ch. 815, 818.
10Bain v. Fothergill, 31 L. T. 382, 7 H. L. 158 (1871).
'Peeler v. Levy, 26 N. 3. Eq. 330 (1875). Contra: Bradford v. Smith,
123 Ia. 24, 98 N. W. 377 (1904); Walker v. Kelley, 91 Mich. 212, 51 N. W.
934 (1892).
"Barker v. Cox, 4 Chan. Div. 464 (1876); Wilson v. Williams, 3 Xur.

(n.s.) 810 (1857).

"Young v. Paul, 10 N. J. Eq. 401 (1855).
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because such relief necessitates so great a departure from the
contract entered into as to be unduly harsh upon the vendor."
One court refused this type of relief because it felt compelled to
leave the wife the option of taking one-third of the purchase
price set aside for her or one-third of her husband's realty at
his death, in accordance with a statutory provision." The fact
that there is a want of mutuality of remedy to such a contract
has given pause to some courts,"0 but this objection is of dubious
validity and has not proved insuperable.'
The third view allows specific performance with the estimated
value of the dower retained by the vendee to be held as indemnity
against the loss occasioned if the dower should later vest. There
is a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the purchaser should
be required to pay interest on the sum retained. If the purchase
price is retained without payment of interest the purchaser has
received more than he is entitled to, a corresponding loss being
thrown on the husband since he is deprived of both the land and
part of the purchase price. The purchaser gets the use of all the
land at only two-thirds of the price while the grantor and his
wife lose all the land and receive only two-thirds of the price.
Furthermore, it is especially likely to produce coercion of the
wife, because unless she releases her rights her husband must
lose and she indirectly suffers therefrom, usually being dependent
upon him. The wife is thus induced to come to the aid of her
husband and sign away her dower rights, unwilling as she may
be to do so. In short, this rule permits the buyer to have the
use of one-third of the land without cost to him frequently, and
imposes a harsh penalty on the husband for being unable to make
good title without reference to any misconduct by him and irrespective of whether his intentions were good or bad."
If interest is paid on the retained purchase price, however,
this rule loses much of its harshness, since interest on one-third
of the price would usually approximate a fair equivalent for the
use of this part of the land while the joint lives of the husband
and wife continue. The vendor receives the interest during the
joint lives of himself and his wife, and the principal on her de"4Humphrey v. Clement, 44 Ill.
299 (1867); Reilly v. Smith, 25 N. J. Eq.

158 (1874).

1 Butler v. Butler, 151 Ia. 583, 132 N. W. 63 (1911).
"0
Graham v. Oliver, 3 Beav. 124, 128 (1840).
7
2 FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS,
(6th ed. 1921) §§ 465-475.
'sThe

unfairness of this rule is well stated by Professor Horack, Specific

Performance and Dower Bights (1926) 11 IowA L. REv. 97, 122.
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cease if he survive her; if she survives him the interest goes to
the wife after the vendor's death and the principal to the vendee
upon her death. ' This was formerly the English practice, ' but
inchoate dower was abolished in England a hundred years ago.'
But even then this rule is subject to criticism. If the value of
the land increases after the contract is made, the wife is forced
to sustain a loss by virtue of a contract which was in effect thrust
upon her by her husband and the purchaser. If, on the other
hand, the value of the land decreases after the contract is entered
into it is not unduly harsh to hold the vendee to the valuation
set in the agreement, since it was his voluntary act. At best, this
rule is capable of operating in gross injustice to the rights of the
wife.
Although there is a possibility of coercion where specific performance is granted with a retention of one-third of the purchase
money upon which interest is to be paid, it is much less than
where a present abatement of the price is made, or where the purchaser is allowed the use of a third of the land without paying
therefor - which would continue during the joint lives of husband and wife unless she chose to relinquish her rights.
It may be suggested that this rule is unfair to the purchaser
in that it requires him to pay interest on one-third of the retained
purchase price when he is not certain that he will ever get more
than two-thirds free of encumbrances. This is balanced by the
fact that he is given the use of the land, and the legal interest
rate on one-third of the purchase price is approximated by the
reasonable value of the use of one-third of the land, subject to
the qualification that such a balance would be upset in case the
value of the land should appreciably vary from the price set in
the contract.
Retention of part of the price as an indemnity contingent upon the vesting of the inchoate right and the final determination of
the precise rights of the parties would ordinarily protect the future interests of all concerned. Even where common law dower
exists and the wife is likely to get a third interest for life in the
land, the possibilities of hardship are much reduced, for if the
"2See note (1924) 9 CoRx. L. Q. 470, at 471. The effect of giving this
much of the principal sum to the vendee roughly approximates equality insofar as it approacles in amount the interest he has paid on-the sum. There
would be exact equality only where the interest payments precisely equalled
the2 ' third of the purchase price.

Wilson v. Williams, &upran. 12.
and 4 Wu. IV, c. 105 (1833).

213
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wife predeceases her husband exacf justice according to their bargain may be done as between vendor and purchaser. If, however, the wife survives her husband the sum retained, while interest on it may not represent the actual value of her life interest, at least will not cause the price to be reduced. The court
can, at the time the husband dies leaving a widow, again estimate
the value of her interest and do it with much more accuracy that
it could have at the agreed date for performance.
It thus appears that some courts refuse specific performance
with compensation when a spouse refuses to join in the conveyance,' and others allow specific performance against the vendor
with some sort of compensation for unreleased dower rights.'
Other methods of protecting the vendee have been devised. Some
courts require the vendor to provide a bond to indemnify the vendee from possible loss by the vesting of the dower,' and others
allow the vendee to show damage resulting to him from the outstanding dower as a cloud on his title, the amount of such damages to be deducted from the purchase price and stand as a lien
on the land for the vendor should he survive his wife.'
One
court even ordered the inchoate dower of the wife figured as consummnate as of the time of the decree and the value thereof deducted."
The West Virginia Revised Code provides for the calculation
and payment of the estimated value of the inchoate dower to the
reluctant spouse (be it the husband or tlte wife) at suit of either
party to the contractf This remedy clearly falls under none of
the rules already considered; it transcends all of them. Its object is quite salutary. Too frequently a shrewish spouse has
been able to prevent the sale of the other's property because the
prospective buyer would not take it subject to dower and the
22Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 11 N. W. 265, 41 Am. Rep. 720 (1882);
Chicago, K. & S. R. Co. v. Lane, 150 Mich. 162, 113 N. W. 22 (1907); Kuratli
v. Jackson, 60 Ore. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 38 L. R. A. 1195 (1911) (specific
performance with compensation refused, purchaser having known at time
of contracting that vendor was married).
I Noeeker v. Wallingford, supra n. 4; Walker v. Kelly, supra n. 11; AipleHemmelnan Real Estate Co. v. Spelbrink, 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480, 14
Ann. Cas. 652 (1908); Saldutti v. Flynn, 72 N. J. Eq. 157, 65 At. 247
(1906); Payne v. Melton, 69 S. C. 373, 48 S. E. 277 (1904); Wannamaker
v. Brown, 77 S. C. 64, 57 S. E. 665 (1906) (vendor held entitled to interest
on retained part of purchase money).
2 Stein v. Francis, supra n. 4.
Granoff v. Xorpus, 182 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1919).
2 Stein v. Francis, supra n. 4.
'7W.
VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 43, art. 1, § 6.
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perverse spouse was unwilling to accept a reasonable sum in lieu
thereof. This situation is made possible because an outstanding
dower renders the title of land so defective as to release a purchaser from the obligation of completing the sale,' and also constitutes a breach of the covenant against incumbrances.' It obviously should not be the policy of the law to permit either a husband or wife to prevent the other from disposing of his or her
interest in land.
But, admitting the desirability of this statute, it is nevertheless subject to criticism:
"The granting of an abatement of a sum in gross to be
deducted from the original agreed price at the time set for
performance has, it seems to the writer, but little to be said
in its favor, for no matter how anxious a court may be to do
justice as between the parties, it is dealing with interests
of so uncertain a nature that any fair or accurate estimate
is absolutely impossible, with the result that while the court
may protect and preserve the interest of the wife, it thrusts
a hardship upon either the husband or the purchaser, in that
it makes them settle for a definite sum and purports to estimate with definiteness interests which from their very nature are incapable of accurate estimation. The result is that
equity has forced the parties into a gamble as to the value
of their rights.' ''
It seems not too inequitable to allow the remedy of specific
performance against a spouse who undertakes to sell and assumes
the responsibility of securing the other's consent, unless the vendor hs expressly conditioned the entire sale upon such other
spouse consenting to release his or her claim. The difficulty with
this situation is that courts go illogically far in construing a contract as having been so conditioned to relieve the vendor from
the hardships of specific performance.'
Furthermore, as pointed out by the court in the principal
case, this statute really benefits rather than burdens the recalci2 Porter v. Noyes, 2 Greenl. 22, 11 Am. Dec. 30 (Me. 1822). But if the
purchaser is willing to take such title as the husband is able to convey, the
court will enforce the contract against the husband. Greenwood v. Ligon,
10 Semdes & M. 615, 48 Am. Dec. 775 (Miss., 1848); Jursheedt v. Union
Dime Say. Inst., 118 N. Y. 358, 23 N. E. 473, 7 L. R. A. 229 (1890).
2OThrasher v. Pinckard's Heirs, 23 Ala. 616 (1853). It does not, however, constitute a breach of the covenant of seisin, or good right to convey,
because it is at most a contingent incumbrance (since the husband may survive the wife) and does not affect his legal title to the land. Whisler v.
Hicks 5 Blackf. 100, 33 Am. Dec. 454 (Ind., 1839).
w Horack, op. cit. supra n. 18, at 127.
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trant spouse. Whereas formerly there was no statutory provision for the payment to the wife of the value of her dower, or
to the husband of what was then a right of curtesy, under the
new rule he or she is given the estimated present value, of such
inchoate interest while the other spouse is still alive and it is
uncertain but that the reluctant party may be the first to die, in
which event under any of the three major judicial rules dower or
curtesy would be worthless.
-INGSLEY

R. SMITH.

8Ibid. at 105 where the writer cited Venator v. Swenson, 100 Ia. 295,
69 N. W. 522 (1896) in which the court said, after deciding on uncertain
evidence that the contract involved was conditioned on the wife's signing:
"It seems to us that this case is like hundreds of others, where men
meet and fix the terms of a sale of land, and fix a time for performance,
tacitly, if not otherwise, understanding that the wives will concur,
and with no expectation of the transaction being completed without such
concurrence. II
See Jackson v. Torrence, 83 Cal. 521, 23 Pac. 695 (1890) ; Spadoni v. Frigo,
307 Ill.32, 138 N. W. 226 (1923); Healy v. Hohnl,
157 Ia. 375, 138 N. W.
551 (1912).
"2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 42, art. 2, § 4, prescribes in detail the
method of determining the value of inchoate dower. See Blevins v. Smith,
154 Mo. 583, 16 S. W. 213, 13 L. R. A. 441 (1891) (holding inchoate dower
a contingency founded on a contingency so not susceptible of computation
by any definite rule); but see also MacKenna v. Fidelity Trust Co., 184
N. Y. 411, 77 N. E. 721 (1906) (holding that purchaser at foreclosure sale
by title subsequent to that of wife could perfect his title by paying her
estimated value of her dower).
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